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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 OTTAWA 000575

SIPDIS

STATE FOR S/SRAP - KAREN HANRAHAN, SCA/A - ARIELLA VIEHE,  
AND EUR/RPM AARON COPE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/23/2019  
TAGS: [PREL](#) [MOPS](#) [MARR](#) [NATO](#) [AF](#) [CA](#)  
SUBJECT: CANADA IN SYNC WITH U.S. ON AFGHAN ASSISTANCE  
POST-ELECTION

REF: A. STATE 74362  
[1](#)B. OTTAWA 488  
[1](#)C. OTTAWA 429  
[1](#)D. 08 OTTAWA 107

Classified By: PolMinCouns Scott Bellard, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

[1](#)1. (U) This is an action request -- see para 8.

[1](#)2. (C) Summary: Canadian policy in Afghanistan is "very much on the same page" as that of the U.S. Canada has tripled its civilian presence in Afghanistan in the last 15 months and will have 50 civilian police advisors by December 2009. In June, Canada contributed \$12 million to the Law and Order Trust Fund to pay the salaries of an additional 1,150 police in Kandahar. Canada is still studying our request for a \$100 million annual contribution over five years to the ANA Trust Fund. Canada would like the U.S. to emphasize judicial sector capacity-building and implementation. Canada is favorably disposed toward contributing more civilian personnel to District Stability Teams, but still seeks answers from the U.S. on the safety, security, and financial implications for placing its people in U.S. areas of operations. End summary.

[1](#)3. (C) Canadian policy in Afghanistan is "very much on the same page" as that of the U.S. (ref a), according to Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) Afghanistan Task Force Acting Director Richard Arbeiter. He added that Canada was currently "ramping up" its civilian presence in Afghanistan, tripling its diplomatic and development personnel on the ground over the last 15 months to a total of 102. He noted that Canada was also on track to fulfill its commitment of 50 civilian police advisors by the end of 2009, with 42 already in place. He expressed strong agreement with the U.S. policy initiative to increase cooperation with UNAMA and the Government of Afghanistan in meeting civilian requirements.

[1](#)4. (C) Arbeiter confirmed that Canada had fulfilled a \$12 million pledge in June to the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan in response to a direct request from the GOA. Afghanistan will use the funds to pay the salaries of an additional 1,150 police officers in Kandahar. Arbeiter also applauded U.S. efforts more tightly to integrate civilian and military elements, and noted that Canada has been proud of the synergy it has gained through integrated civilian-military planning, intelligence analysis, decision making, and reporting in Kandahar, a process Canada had begun as a result of the recommendations from the Manley Panel in 2008 (ref d). Arbeiter stressed that Canada's approximate C\$300 million annual budget for Kandahar "is safe" in the post-election period and "will remain constant" through 2011. He commented that neither the Conservative government nor the opposition Liberal Party had talked about cutting

Afghanistan-related funding for the remainder of Canada's military mission through 2011.

¶5. (C) Regarding the requested \$100 million Canadian annual contribution over five years to the ANA Trust Fund, Arbeiter acknowledged that Canada was still "studying" the issue. He added that Canada was seeking a "better understanding of the broad governance issues" of the trust fund and continued to benefit from participation in the on-going, intensive discussions in Brussels. DFAIT will need to explain to senior leaders how Canadian funding would be used (i.e. infrastructure, salaries, pensions), Arbeiter underscored. The second, more specific issue for Canada was better to understand whether trust funds can be targeted toward Kandahar and RC-South. He stressed that a major increase in funding, as requested by the U.S., would have to reinforce Canada's overall strategy, which focuses on six benchmarks in southern Afghanistan. He noted as well that Canadian law prohibits DFAIT and the Canadian International Development Agency from providing lethal assistance. Canadian senior officials would require DFAIT to provide strong assurances that Afghanistan was not using Canadian funds to buy weapons before they would sign off on such a significant contemplated increase.

¶6. (C) Regarding the post-election period and beyond, Arbeiter made a special pitch for the U.S. to focus on non-police-related rule of law programs. He lamented that Afghanistan currently does not have a program for justice sector implementation reform and capacity building. He commented that Canada had recently added one Canadian legal expert to its PRT to assist with justice reforms in Kandahar.

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He observed that a functioning, competent judicial system in Kandahar -- which houses the only court house in the region -- would bring benefits throughout southern Afghanistan. However, he was said he "realistic" on Canada's "limited capacity" to reform the entire country's judicial sector and noted that only the U.S. and other allies together could make a meaningful difference in this crucial area. He underlined that the GOA's inability or unwillingness to provide impartial, effective justice would be an important factor in creating public sympathy for the Taliban.

¶7. (C) Post-election, Canada would also be favorably disposed toward contributing additional civilian personnel to District Stability Teams in Spin Boldak and Shah Wali Kot near Kandahar, according to Arbeiter. He regretted, however, that Canada could not make any firm decisions before conducting "due diligence" on the safety, security, and financial implications of placing Canadian civilians in U.S. teams and areas of operation. Arbeiter stressed that he could not prepare the issue for cabinet approval until DFAIT had received a satisfactory response from the USG to the Canadian request (ref b) for information on rules of engagement, mobility, communications access, force protection, post-incident evacuation, and financial cost recovery expectations for these services by the U.S.

¶8. (C) Comment and action request: We are overdue in providing a fulsome and helpful response to Canadian concerns outlined in ref b and para 7, and request clear guidance from Washington as quickly as possible.

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